

# The Economics of Governed Work

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## Abstract

If governance is compilation [1-25], then governance work produces compilation output. In classical software, compilation output is a binary. In governed systems, compilation output is a compliance score. This paper asks the question that follows: what happens when compliance scores produce economic value? We present the COIN economy a closed economic system in which governance work (WORK) mints economic units (COIN) proportional to the governance improvement achieved. The minting function is the gradient:  $\text{amount} = \text{to\_bits} - \text{from\_bits}$ . Only marginal governance improvement earns value; absolute scores do not mint. Governance regression (DRIFT) penalizes the actor through DEBIT. The system defines a supply ceiling bounded by the governance surface area ( $\text{SUPPLY\_CEILING} = \text{unique\_scopes}$  CE 255), monthly reconciliation via CLOSE events, and cryptographic signing of all circulation events. We prove that this economy is closed every COIN is sourced, every COIN is sunk, every state is defined, and the conservation equation holds:  $\text{Total} = \text{Treasury} + \text{Circulation} + \text{Archived} - \text{Burned}$ . The economy requires no external currency to function. Governance work is the monetary base. The code is the evidence. The ledger is the proof.

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**Compliance costs money and proves nothing. Governed work mints COIN and proves everything. The economy is closed.**

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February 23, 2026

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## 1. Abstract

If governance is compilation <sup>2</sup>, then governance work produces compilation output. In classical software, compilation output is a binary. In governed systems, compilation output is a compliance score. This paper asks the question that follows: what happens when compliance scores produce economic value? We present the COIN economy a closed economic system in which governance work (WORK) mints economic units (COIN) proportional to the governance improvement achieved. The minting function is the gradient:  $\text{amount} = \text{to\_bits} - \text{from\_bits}$ . Only marginal governance improvement earns value; absolute scores do not mint. Governance regression (DRIFT) penalizes the actor through DEBIT. The system defines a supply ceiling bounded by the governance surface area ( $\text{SUPPLY\_CEILING} = \text{unique\_scopes} \in 255$ ), monthly reconciliation via CLOSE events, and cryptographic signing of all circulation events. We prove that this economy is closed every COIN is sourced, every COIN is sunk, every state is defined, and the conservation equation holds:  $\text{Total} = \text{Treasury} + \text{Circulation} + \text{Archived} - \text{Burned}$ . The economy requires no external currency to function. Governance work is the monetary base. The code is the evidence. The ledger is the proof.

## 2. Table of Contents

1. The Cost Center Problem
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Appendix A: Event Shapes Appendix B: Onboarding Arithmetic

### 3. 1. The Cost Center Problem

Enterprise governance is a cost center. Organizations budget for compliance the way they budget for insurance: a necessary expense that produces no direct revenue, delivers no measurable product, and generates no economic return proportional to its cost. The annual compliance spend in regulated industries runs to hundreds of billions of dollars<sup>3</sup>. The return on this investment is the absence of penalty a negative definition of value that makes economic optimization impossible.

The problem is structural, not operational. Governance work writing policies, documenting controls, answering audit questions, maintaining evidence is real work. It consumes real labor hours. It produces real artifacts. But these artifacts have no economic identity. A HIPAA compliance document does not have a price. A SOC2 evidence package does not have a market value. The work that produces them does not appear on any balance sheet as an asset. It appears only as an expense.

This asymmetry is the disease. The work is real. The value is real. The economic recogni-

tion is absent. The consequence is predictable: organizations minimize compliance spending because the return is invisible, under-invest in governance infrastructure because the investment has no measurable payoff, and treat governance as overhead rather than output<sup>4</sup>.

We propose the correction: make governance work economically visible by making it directly mint economic value.

### 4. 2. Work as the Monetary Base

In fiat economies, the monetary base is issued by a central authority a central bank that creates money through policy decisions, lending facilities, and open market operations. The supply of money is a policy choice, disconnected from any specific productive activity<sup>5</sup>. This disconnection is the source of both fiat flexibility and fiat instability: money can be created without work, and money can be destroyed without reason.

In the COIN economy<sup>6</sup>, the monetary base is issued by work. Specifically, by governance work that improves a scopes compliance score. There is no central authority that decides how much COIN to issue. There is no policy lever that inflates or deflates supply. The supply of COIN is a mechanical consequence of governance activity: work produces COIN, and only work produces COIN.

The axiom is formal:

**WORK = COIN. Every action minted.  
Every mint ledgered.**<sup>6</sup>

This is not a metaphor. It is a protocol rule. When a governed scopes compliance score improves, the improvement is minted as COIN. When no improvement occurs, no COIN is minted. The monetary base cannot grow without governance work, and governance work cannot

occur without the monetary base growing. The coupling is total.

The implications are immediate. In a fiat economy, you earn money by persuading someone to pay you. In the COIN economy, you earn COIN by doing governance work that the compiler validates. No persuasion is required. No market negotiation occurs. The amount earned is determined by the governance improvement achieved, not by the willingness of a counterparty to pay. The price of governance work is not set by a market. It is computed by a compiler.

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### 5. 3. The Gradient Rule

The minting function is the gradient the difference between the new compliance score and the previous compliance score:

```
gradient = to_bits - from_bits
```

If the gradient is positive, the governance improved. The improvement is minted as COIN:

```
MINT:WORK(amount = gradient)
```

If the gradient is zero, the governance did not change. No COIN is minted. The action was neutral a rearrangement that neither improved nor degraded compliance. In evolutionary terms <sup>7</sup>, this is drift: a selectively neutral mutation at fitness equilibrium.

If the gradient is negative, the governance regressed. The regression is penalized:

```
DEBIT:DRIFT(amount = abs(gradient))
```

The gradient rule has a critical property: it mints the delta, never the absolute score. A scope at 255 that commits a change and remains at 255 earns zero COIN. The governance is already perfect. There is no marginal improvement to reward. Only new governance work work that

moves a scope from a lower score to a higher one creates economic value.

This property eliminates rent-seeking. An actor cannot earn COIN by repeatedly asserting existing governance. The actor must do new work. The work must be validated by the compiler. The compiler must produce a higher score. Only then does COIN appear. This is the economic equivalent of proof-of-work in Bitcoin <sup>8</sup>, but the work is not computational waste it is governance improvement. The work produces compliance. The compliance produces COIN. The COIN produces economic identity for the work.

The gradient also determines the maximum COIN a single scope can produce:

```
max_mint(scope) = 255 - 0 = 255 COIN
```

A scope that begins at 0 and reaches full compliance at 255 will have minted exactly 255 COIN over its lifetime. Not more. The governance journey from zero to full compliance is valued at exactly 255 COIN, regardless of how many commits it takes, how long it requires, or who performs the work. The value is in the governance, not in the labor.

---

### 6. 4. Circulation Events

COIN does not only come into existence. It moves, transfers, and exits. The COIN economy defines a complete set of circulation events <sup>6</sup>:

**MINT:WORK** governance improvement creates COIN. The amount is the gradient. The COIN is credited to the actors WALLET. This is the primary source of COIN in the economy.

**MINT:SIGNUP** a new user receives 500 COIN upon joining the system. This is the onboarding bonus: enough COIN to participate in the economy immediately, without first performing governance work. The 500 COIN is not free it is an advance against future work, an investment in the users governance potential.

**MINT:PYRAMID** a user who refers a new user receives 500 COIN. This is the referral mechanism: the existing user is rewarded for expanding the governance workforce. The name is deliberate. Pyramid structures are sustainable when the underlying value is real, and governance work is real.

**DEBIT:DRIFT** governance regression destroys COIN. The amount is the absolute value of the negative gradient. This is the penalty for backsliding: if you break governance, you pay for the damage.

**TRANSFER** COIN moves between users. A 5% fee is retained by the TREASURY. There are no fee-free transfers. Every transfer enriches the system.

**SPEND** COIN purchases a SHOP product. The buyers WALLETS are debited. The sellers WALLETS are credited. This is dual-entry accounting: every SPEND event produces two records. Products in the SHOP have prices denominated in COIN, and the prices reflect governance tiers.

**SETTLE** COIN exits the system for fiat currency via Stripe. The exchange rate is defined by the system (SHOP\_COIN\_USD\_CENTS, default 100 = \$1.00/COIN). The COIN is debited immediately. The fiat disbursement is asynchronous. This is the off-ramp: the point where governance value converts to fiat value.

**CLOSE** monthly reconciliation. On the first of each month, every WALLETS are reconciled against the LEDGER. Balances are derived from event chains, compared to stored snapshots, and mismatches are flagged. No COIN is created or destroyed. CLOSE is a checkpoint, not a transaction.

These eight events are exhaustive. There is no ninth way for COIN to enter, leave, or move within the system. The economy is closed by enumeration.

## 7. 5. The Wallet as Ledger

In traditional banking, a wallet (account) has a balance that is updated in place. When you deposit \$100, the balance changes from \$X to \$X+100. The previous balance is overwritten. The account is a mutable register.

In the COIN economy, the WALLETS are an append-only event chain<sup>9</sup>. There is no mutable balance field. The balance is a derived quantity the sum of all credits minus the sum of all debits across the entire event history:

$$\text{balance}(\text{user}) = \text{SUM}(\text{credits}) - \text{SUM}(\text{debits}) \text{ FROM timeline}$$

The balance is never stored independently. It is always computed from the chain. This means the WALLETS are not a register. It is a ledger. Every event that has ever affected the users COIN every MINT, every DEBIT, every TRANSFER, every SPEND, every SETTLE is permanently recorded in the chain. The chain is hash-linked: each event includes the hash of the previous event, creating a tamper-evident sequence. After the signature cutoff date, every event is cryptographically signed with the users Ed25519 key<sup>9</sup>.

The WALLETS have seven invariants:

1. Append-only. No in-place edits. Events are added, never modified or deleted.
2. Chain-verifiable. Each event's hash includes its predecessor. Breaking the chain is detectable.
3. Dual-write. Every event writes to the USER timeline, the ORG timeline, and the LEDGER. Three copies, three verification paths.
4. Derived balance. Balance is computed, not stored. No cache can diverge from the chain.
5. Ed25519-signed. After the signature cutoff, every event carries a cryptographic signature. Unsigned events are rejected.
6. Monthly CLOSE. Reconciliation is mandatory. Mismatches are flagged, not silently ignored.

7. Supply ceiling enforced. Before every MINT:WORK, the cumulative supply is checked against the ceiling. Excess mints are rejected.

These invariants make the WALLET an auditable, tamper-evident, cryptographically secured record of all economic activity. The WALLET is not trusted. It is verified. Every balance claim can be independently derived from the event chain. Every event can be independently verified against its signature. The auditor is the algorithm.

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## 8. 6. Supply Ceiling

Fiat economies have no hard supply ceiling. Central banks can create money without limit, constrained only by policy decisions and their consequences (inflation, devaluation, loss of confidence). Cryptocurrency economies have hard supply ceilings (Bitcoin: 21 million <sup>8</sup>) but the ceiling is arbitrary chosen by the protocol designer, not derived from the systems productive capacity.

The COIN economy has a supply ceiling derived from governance:

`SUPPLY_CEILING = unique_scopes ⋈ 255`

Each governed scope can produce at most 255 COIN of MINT:WORK the maximum gradient from score 0 to score 255. The ceiling grows only when new scopes are created. Creating a new governance scope a new paper, a new book chapter, a new service, a new organizational domain adds 255 COIN of capacity to the ceiling. The economy expands by governing more, not by inflating existing governance.

Before every MINT:WORK event, the system enforces the ceiling <sup>9</sup>:

1. Count unique scope keys in the LEDGER chainmanagers decision, a performance review, or a

2. `ceiling = unique_scopes ⋈ 255.`
3. Sum all MINT:WORK amounts from the ORG timeline.
4. Reject if `cumulative + new_amount > ceiling.`

This enforcement is mechanical. There is no override. There is no quantitative easing for governance. If the ceiling is reached, the only way to mint more COIN is to create new governance scopes which means doing new governance work, which means the economy grows proportionally to the governance surface area of the system.

The ceiling also provides a natural valuation anchor. The total COIN in circulation can never exceed the total governance surface area multiplied by 255. This means the COIN supply is bounded by real governance work, not by monetary policy. The price of COIN in fiat terms is anchored to the cost of doing governance work: the labor, tools, and infrastructure required to bring a scope from 0 to 255.

---

## 9. 7. DEBIT:DRIFT The Price of Regression

Most economic systems reward positive outcomes but do not penalize negative ones with equal force. A developer who introduces a bug loses nothing (economically) from the bug itself they lose only if the bug causes a downstream consequence that is detected and attributed. The penalty is indirect, delayed, and often absorbed by the organization rather than the individual.

In the COIN economy, governance regression has an immediate, direct, proportional economic penalty. If a governance change reduces a scopes score, the negative gradient is debited from the actors WALLET:

`DEBIT:DRIFT(amount = abs(to_bits - from_bits))`

The penalty is automatic. It does not require a

disciplinary process. The compiler detects the regression. The LEDGER records it. The WALLET debits it. The feedback loop is complete within the same commit cycle.

The penalty is proportional. A regression from 255 to 254 (loss of 1 bit, the lowest-weight dimension) costs 1 COIN. A regression from 255 to 127 (loss of the highest-weight dimension) costs 128 COIN. The economic signal matches the governance signal: losing the most important dimension is the most expensive.

The penalty is symmetric in magnitude but asymmetric in difficulty. Earning 128 COIN by improving from 127 to 255 requires adding a major governance dimension significant work. Losing 128 COIN by regressing from 255 to 127 requires only deleting one file trivial destruction. The asymmetry is intentional. Destruction is easy. Construction is hard. The economic penalty for destruction must be at least as large as the economic reward for construction, or the system incentivizes demolition.

DEBIT:DRIFT transforms governance regression from an abstract quality concern into a concrete financial loss. The question should I delete this governance file? becomes am I willing to pay the COIN cost of the score reduction? This is not governance by committee. This is governance by consequence.

---

## 10. 8. Monthly CLOSE

The CLOSE event occurs on the first of each month. It is the economy's reconciliation point the moment when the LEDGER truth is compared to the WALLET truth and discrepancies are surfaced.

The CLOSE algorithm is deterministic<sup>9</sup>:

1. For each USER: derive balance from the event TIMELINE. Compare to the stored WALLET snapshot. Flag any MISMATCH.

2. Walk the LEDGER chain: verify that each governance event (.idf record) has a corresponding WALLET event (MINT:WORK or DEBIT:DRIFT). Report unreconciled events.
3. Append a CLOSE event to each USER TIMELINE:
 

```
{ "event": "CLOSE",
  "month": "YYYY-MM", "amount": 0,
  "delta": 0 }.
```
4. Report: total COIN in circulation, unreconciled count, mismatches.

CLOSE is a checkpoint, not a truncation. The TIMELINE is append-only forever. CLOSE does not delete history. It verifies it. The CLOSE event itself becomes part of the chain a signed assertion that reconciliation was performed and the state was consistent (or that specific mismatches were identified).

The CLOSE cadence monthly is a governance choice. It could be weekly, daily, or per-commit. Monthly balances the cost of reconciliation against the risk of undetected drift. In a system where every individual event is already hash-chained and signed, the CLOSE serves primarily as a human-readable checkpoint: a moment when a governor can look at the economy and say the books balance.

If the books do not balance, the MISMATCH flag is a governance event in itself. It indicates either a bug in the system (a LEDGER event that failed to produce a WALLET event), a tampering attempt (a WALLET event that has no LEDGER counterpart), or a reconciliation failure (a mathematical disagreement between the chain-derived balance and the stored snapshot). Each of these is a different class of failure, and each has a different remediation path. The CLOSE algorithm does not remediate. It reports. Remediation is governance work and governance work, if it improves a score, mints COIN.

## 11. 9. Tier Economics

The COIN economy is not flat. Products in the SHOP are priced by governance tier the audience tier that the product serves:

Tier	COIN Price	Audience	Example Products
COMMUNITY	85	Anyone	Blog posts (free), community papers
ENTERPRISE	63	Business buyers	The Art of the CANONIC Deal
AGENT	127	Developers, Governors	The CANONIC Doctrine, The CANONIC CANON
FULL	255	General public	Dividends and Deaths, Atulisms

The prices are not market-determined. They are tier-determined. The audience tier defines the price. This means pricing is a governance decision, not a market decision. The question is not what will the market bear? but what tier does this product serve?

The onboarding math is exact. Every new user receives 500 COIN via MINT:SIGNUP. This budget is sufficient to purchase products in every tier:

DEV path: Doctrine (127) + CANON (127) = 254  
 GOV path: CANON (127) + ART (63) = 190  
 READER path: DIVIDENDS (255) = 255  
 BUSINESS: ART (63) + Doctrine (127) = 190

Every path leaves COIN in the WALLET. The remaining COIN is not dead weight. It is an incentive to do governance work (which mints more COIN) or to purchase additional products (which circulates COIN to sellers). The 500 COIN onboarding bonus is calibrated to enable full participation without enabling unlimited consumption. The user must eventually do WORK to replenish their WALLET.

The tier pricing model also defines a natural COST\_BASIS for products <sup>6</sup>:

```
cost_basis(product) = SUM(MINT:WORK.amount)
WHERE work_ref matches the scope producing the product
```

The cost basis of a product is the total governance work that produced it the sum of all gradients committed to the scope. A book that required 50 governance commits, each improving the scopes score by varying gradients, has a cost basis equal to the sum of those gradients. The SHOP price SHOULD be at least the cost basis (the governance work invested) but is not required to be free products are valid.

## 12. 10. The Conservation Equation

The COIN economy satisfies a conservation equation:

$$\text{Total COIN} = \text{Treasury} + \text{Circulation} + \text{Archived} - \text{Burned}$$

This equation holds at every point in time. Every COIN in existence is in exactly one of four states: in the TREASURY (the systems reserve, fed by transfer fees), in Circulation (in a users WALLET, actively available), in Archive (in a WALLET that has been inactive for more than 7 years, at which point the balance returns to TREASURY), or Burned (permanently removed from the system through deflationary mechanisms).

The equation is verifiable. The TREASURY balance is derived from TREASURY events. The Circulation balance is the sum of all USER WALLET balances. The Archived balance is the sum of balances returned from inactive WALLETs. The Burned balance is the sum of explicit burn events. At any point, an observer can independently compute all four quantities from the LEDGER chain and verify that the equation holds.

The conservation equation has a consequence: the economy cannot leak. Every COIN that enters must exit or remain. There are no undefined

states. There are no orphan transitions. The system is closed. This is the fundamental property that distinguishes the COIN economy from traditional compliance spending, where cost flows out and value dissipates without a conservation constraint.

---

## 13. 11. Closure Proof

We prove that the COIN economy is closed that every possible state is defined and every possible transition is accounted for.

**Sources (defined and exhaustive):** - MINT:WORK governance improvement mints COIN. Amount = gradient. - MINT:SIGNUP new user receives 500 COIN. - MINT:PYRAMID referrer receives 500 COIN. - TREASURY recycling transfer fees and archived balances return to TREASURY.

**Sinks (defined and exhaustive):** - DEBIT:DRIFT governance regression destroys COIN. - SETTLE COIN exits to fiat. - ARCHIVE\_TIMEOUT 7 years of inactivity returns balance to TREASURY. - Burns explicit deflationary removal.

**States (exhaustive):** - Phase 1 (Bootstrap): TREASURY > 0. System is expansionary. SIGNUP and PYRAMID bonuses funded from TREASURY. - Phase 2 (Circulation): TREASURY = 0. System is purely circulatory. SIGNUP and PYRAMID bonuses are zero or funded from recycled fees. Only MINT:WORK creates new COIN.

**Transitions (complete):** - Phase 1 Phase 2: TREASURY depletes through SIGNUP and PYRAMID bonuses. - Zero balance positive: user performs governance work (MINT:WORK). - Active Archive: 7 years of zero TIMELINE activity. - Archive TREASURY: balance returns.

**Conservation (verified):**

At any time  $t$ :

$$\text{Total}(t) = \text{Treasury}(t) + \text{Circulation}(t) + \text{Archived}(t)$$

This is verifiable from the LEDGER chain. The sum of all MINT events minus the sum of all DEBIT, SETTLE, and BURN events equals the total COIN in existence. The total in existence equals the sum of TREASURY, Circulation, and Archived. The equation holds by construction: every event that creates COIN is a MINT, every event that destroys COIN is a DEBIT/SETTLE/BURN, and every COIN in existence is in exactly one location.

The economy is closed. No COIN is created without work or policy (SIGNUP/PYRAMID). No COIN is destroyed without regression or exit. No COIN exists outside a defined location. No state transition is undefined. The proof is constructive: the eight circulation events enumerate all possible transitions, and the conservation equation verifies the invariant.

---

## 14. 12. Implications for Enterprise

The economic model presented here has direct implications for enterprise governance:

**Governance becomes a profit center.** Every governance commit that improves a scopes score mints COIN. The COIN has a defined fiat exchange rate (default \$1.00/COIN via SETTLE). This means governance work has a direct, computable dollar value. A scope improvement from 127 to 255 is worth 128 COIN = \$128. The compliance teams output is no longer an invisible cost. It is a measurable, monetizable asset.

**Governance regression has a price.** DEBIT:DRIFT means that breaking compliance costs COIN. The developer who accidentally deletes a COVERAGE.md and drops a scope from 255 to 127 loses 128 COIN from their WALLET. This economic signal propagates governance awareness to every contributor, not just the compliance team. Governance is no

longer someone else's problem. It is everyone's WALLET.

**The audit is replaced by the CLOSE.** The monthly CLOSE event performs the same function as an annual audit: reconcile the records, verify consistency, flag discrepancies, but it does so monthly, automatically, and at zero marginal cost. The CLOSE algorithm is deterministic. It does not require auditors. It requires a LEDGER and a clock.

**Compliance spending is recoverable.** In the traditional model, compliance spending is a sunk cost. In the COIN model, compliance spending mints COIN. The COIN can be spent on products (buying books, papers, services), transferred to other users, or settled to fiat. The compliance budget is not consumed. It is converted.

**The supply ceiling creates natural scarcity.** Unlike fiat compliance spending (which can inflate without limit), the COIN supply is bounded by  $\text{unique\_scopes} \in 255$ . The only way to expand the money supply is to create new governance scopes, which means doing new governance work. The economy cannot inflate without real work. This makes COIN a credible store of governance value, not a speculative token.

The enterprise that adopts this model does not merely improve its compliance process. It transforms compliance from a cost center to a value-generating system: a system where every governance commit has a price, every governance regression has a cost, and the entire governance surface area of the organization is continuously valued in COIN.

The code is the evidence. The gradient is the value. The WALLET is the proof.

## 15. Appendix A: Event Shapes

### 15.1 MINT:WORK

```
{
  "id":      "<12-char SHA256>",
  "prev":   "<previous event id>",
  "ts":     "<ISO 8601 UTC>",
  "event":  "MINT:WORK",
  "user":   "<USER principal>",
  "amount": "<gradient>",
  "delta":  "<gradient (signed)>",
  "work_ref": "idf:<16-char hex idf_id>",
  "service": "LEDGER",
  "product": "WORK",
  "note":   "git-commit:<domain>",
  "signature": "<Ed25519 hex>"
}
```

### 15.2 DEBIT:DRIFT

```
{
  "id":      "<12-char SHA256>",
  "prev":   "<previous event id>",
  "ts":     "<ISO 8601 UTC>",
  "event":  "DEBIT:DRIFT",
  "user":   "<USER principal>",
  "amount": "<abs(gradient)>",
  "delta":  "<gradient (signed, negative)>",
  "work_ref": "idf:<16-char hex idf_id>",
  "service": "LEDGER",
  "product": "WORK",
  "note":   "git-commit:<domain>",
  "signature": "<Ed25519 hex>"
}
```

### 15.3 SPEND

```
{
  "event":  "SPEND",
  "user":   "<USER principal>",
  "amount": "<COIN price>",
  "delta":  "<-amount (buyer) | +amount (seller)>",
  "counterparty": "<other party USER principal>",
  "work_ref": "spend-<product-slug>",
  "service": "SHOP",
  "product": "<PRODUCT slug>"
}
```

## 15.4 SETTLE

```
{
  "event": "SETTLE",
  "user": "<USER principal>",
  "amount": "<COIN to exit>",
  "delta": "<-amount>",
  "counterparty": "STRIPE",
  "work_ref": "<Stripe session ID>",
  "service": "WALLET",
  "product": "SETTLE",
  "channel": "STRIPE"
}
```

500 - 63 (ART) - 127 (Doctrine) = 310 COIN remaining  
 310 - 127 (CANON) = 183 COIN remaining  
 183 - 255 (DIVIDENDS) insufficient, need 72 more  
 Action: do WORK MINT:WORK earn 72+ purchase

Every pathway terminates at the same incentive: do WORK. The 500 COIN onboarding budget is deliberately finite. It enables participation. It does not enable passivity. The economy rewards governors, not consumers.

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## 16. Appendix B: Onboarding Arithmetic

Every new user enters with 500 COIN (MINT:SIGNUP). The following pathways demonstrate that every audience can participate meaningfully:

### Developer pathway:

500 - 127 (Doctrine) - 127 (CANON) = 246 COIN remaining  
 246 - 63 (ART) = 183 COIN remaining  
 183 - 35 (any paper) @ 5 = 8 COIN remaining  
 Action: do WORK MINT:WORK replenish

### Governor pathway:

500 - 127 (CANON) - 63 (ART) = 310 COIN remaining  
 310 - 127 (Doctrine) = 183 COIN remaining  
 183 - 35 (papers) @ 5 = 8 COIN remaining  
 Action: do WORK MINT:WORK replenish

### Reader pathway:

500 - 255 (DIVIDENDS) = 245 COIN remaining  
 245 - 127 (CANON or Doctrine) = 118 COIN remaining  
 118 - 35 (papers) @ 3 = 13 COIN remaining  
 Action: do WORK MINT:WORK replenish

### Business pathway:

## 17. References

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